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14 JUL 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Secretary of the Navy

SUBJECT : Soviet Naval Readiness

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1. I have reviewed the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on "The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces" and am aware of the controversy which preceded its publication. This document is a valuable first step in evaluating the quality and readiness of Soviet forces. This examination

must be continued with greater cooperation among the participants; & it must be extended to the other Soviet armed forces.

2. Specifically, I request that you insure senior level support to future interagency studies. In the naval readiness study, for example, some agencies reversed their positions at the last moment because of a lack of early top level participation. Ongoing studies of the readiness of Soviet forces cannot hope to succeed without your personal support.

Specifically, I request that the DCI & the Navy commence a follow-on study of Soviet naval readiness & intensify collection of data on corresponding Soviet data.

3. I also ask that the Navy provide more benchline data to the intelligence community on US operations, such as unit availabilities, deployment rates, training, maintenance, and personnel statistics. This information is essential if we are to make the comparisons which will lead to informed judgments concerning Soviet readiness and capabilities.

4. Additionally, basic research on the qualitative aspects of Soviet naval power is needed. We must know more about their recruiting, training, motivation, and command practices. This information, matched with a comprehensive assessment of their weapon systems, will provide a more complete picture.

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The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

DCI Talking Points
for SecDef Brown

on

Soviet Naval Readiness IIM

A. Readiness IIM complete

- Responds to your request.
- Took 2 years.
- Represents interagency views, but very controversial.

B. Major Judgments include

- Increase in real capabilities over last 20 years tempered by personnel and material deficiencies that affect readiness to fight major war.
- Designed for short, intense war.
- Need period of warning.
- Limited endurance.
- Shortage of experienced personnel; conscripts/low reenlistment.
- Command practices, narrow training, unrealistic exercises discourage initiative and flexibility.

• Unit availability
with 3 days alert

SSBNs: 43%
attack submarines: 34%
major surface ships: 27%

with 25 days alert

Percentages double.

C. DoD cooperation on IIM was mixed

- Some contributions prompt, useful: For example, Navy-chaired surface ship working group provided the most useful and complete study.
- In some critical areas requests ignored and commitments not honored:
Examples include
 - The DNI fought for and obtained chairmanship of key interagency working group on Soviet submarines. Despite urgings and complaints to DNI from NIO staff, this group held almost no meetings, produced no usable document, and left NIO staff and CIA to produce draft submarine section at last minute using its own resources.
 - DIA, in some instances, pulled experts off this study to prepare low-level briefings for overseas conferences.
 - NSA command and analytical elements were kept ignorant of the substance and progress of the paper by their own representative until the last stage.

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- We could not obtain usable comparative availability data on equivalent US forces.
- We could not get permission to make comparative statements about US forces (yet, DoD agencies continually argued that US Navy suffers similar deficiencies). This ban extended even to publicly known figures, such as US SSBN deployment rates.
- DoD principals did not focus on paper until late in coordination process; characterized by "eleventh hour" reversals of position and intense behind-the-scenes lobbying for DoD unity by DIA and Naval Intelligence.

D. Nevertheless, IIM breaks new analytical ground and is valuable first step to evaluate quality of Soviet Navy.

E. Should continue examination of Soviet Naval Readiness; but with improved DoD, particularly Navy, participation. Specifically:

- Navy should provide comparative data on US operations, such as unit availability over specified time periods, deployment rates, training, maintenance, personnel statistics, etc.
- Navy should commit collection resources for a concentrated examination of the training and exercise activity of individual combatants as they deploy out-of-area. With baseline data on a few specific units, we can extrapolate for force.
- DoD should be more willing to concentrate its analytical efforts--early in the process--on interagency studies with high-level interest.

NOTE: Initial Navy cooperation on forthcoming IIM on Soviet Atlantic SLOC Interdiction is encouraging. I trust it will continue. DIA, on the other hand, is not supporting this effort seriously.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Letterhead

Approved For Release 2004/08/23 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300130008-8

14 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT : Soviet Naval Readiness ☐

25X1

1. I have reviewed the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on "The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces" which I requested be prepared and am aware of the controversy which preceded its publication. The document is a very valuable first step in evaluating the quality and readiness of Soviet forces. This examination of the Soviet Navy must be continued with even greater cooperation among the participants; and it must be extended to the other Soviet armed forces.

2. Specifically, I request that the DCI and the Navy commence a follow-on study of Soviet naval readiness and that the Navy provide more benchline data on U.S. operations, such as unit availabilities, deployment rates, training, maintenance, and personnel statistics, and intensify collection of data on corresponding Secret data. This information is essential if we are to make the comparisons which will lead to informed judgments concerning Soviet readiness and capabilities. Additionally, more basic research on the qualitative aspects of Soviet naval power is needed. We must know more about their recruiting, training, motivation, and command practices. This information, matched with a comprehensive assessment of their weapon systems, will provide a more complete picture.

3. I further request that the DCI advise me and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force of his view of areas for prospective studies of Sof Soviet and general force readiness.

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

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Thinking About the Future of the Navy

by Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.)

In the years since World War II, naval aviation has emerged as the Navy's primary element. It is the area where we are most ahead of the Soviet Navy, and it represents our only effective means of responding at great distance and quickly to new long-range missile threats. Naval aviation is vital to protecting our military forces at sea and our convoys, vital to denying an enemy free use of the sea, and vital to projecting power, to amphibious assault and to air strikes. In short, naval aviation is the key today to the Navy being able to carry out its two basic functions: sea control and projection of power ashore.

Because this is the case, all segments of the navy bear great responsibility to prepare naval aviation soundly for the future. To do that well, there must exist a strategic concept, an objective, an understanding of what naval aviation must be prepared to do in the next two decades if the United States Navy is to fulfill its role in national security. In what circumstances will sea control be the role of naval aviation control? In what circumstances will it be power projection? Will the same aviation Navy be able to fulfill the needs of both functions?

I start with the fundamental premise that sea control is the primary role for naval aviation. Twice in this century, in World Wars I and II, the vital security of the United States was challenged by the potential loss of Europe to hostile forces. Our ability to maintain control of the North Atlantic sea lanes against a formidable and determined German U-boat threat permitted us to resupply our European allies as well as move our own forces and supplies to the battle zones. The Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was decisive in our ability to turn back the tide of aggression on the continent of Europe. Today, aside from the strategic role of our SSBNs, keeping sea lanes open remains the single most important reason for having a Navy. The most important of those sea lanes remain those of the Atlantic.

We tend not to think about the control of sea lanes very much anymore and some even denigrate its importance. We talk today of the unlikelihood of a third, prolonged, conventional war in Europe, of ever having to wrest control of the Atlantic again. But that is far from an original insight. The short war thesis was the conventional wisdom in 1914 and again in 1939. It was wrong both times. Another war in Europe may well be over in less than 30 days. If so, control of the Atlantic will be irrelevant. But, if war comes to Europe and if our short war prediction is not correct, both sides will immediately focus their entire effort on the North Atlantic umbilical. It would be very unwise to build the United States Navy on the assumption that we can predict whether a war will be long or short. That choice may very well not be ours to make. If that estimate should prove wrong, and if the Navy were not ready to maintain a sustained sea control effort, the country's basic security would be at risk. All Chiefs of Naval Operations, all Secretaries of Defense know in their inner recesses that being able to meet the threat to our use of the sea is the core reason for having a navy. And if war comes, they will not likely divert the navy to any other task until this key issue is resolved.

Yet, despite the importance of sea control, since World War II the only combatant use of the United States Navy has been in power projection in the Third World. Unfortunately this tends to hypnotize us, and for years has caused us to try to fit our naval power projection capabilities into our military strategy for war in Europe. It will not work. The contribution of power projection by the United States Navy to a major war in Europe can only be marginal. It is marginal first because of sheer numbers. The number of aircraft which we can bring to bear from the sea is insignificant in comparison to available land-based tactical air. It is marginal secondly because for mutual defense it would require three or four carriers in any high risk area where you would have to go to check power on the continent. No Chief of Naval Operations or Secretary of Defense would risk one-half to two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet carrier force for a peripheral force augmentation of this kind.

Many people do not agree that carriers are essential to winning the battle for sea control. Too often sea control is relegated to P-3s, destroyers and submarines. But, they cannot do it alone. When the sea control threat is broken down, its most dangerous component is long-range missiles launched from aircraft, ships or submarines, perhaps 50 to 100 miles from our force. To counter these, sea-based aircraft are absolutely essential. To detect an incoming aircraft or even a surface ship closing the force, radar antennas or other sensors need to be high in the sky. Even the detection of submarines, nuclear submarines, requires a radar platform aloft.

One of the most important advantages we have in the contest for sea control is that the enemy must clearly identify his target. The enemy aircraft, ship or submarine, must close our force enough and use enough of his sensors to ensure that he knows what he is targeting. This gives us a counter-detection opportunity as well as the opportunity with aircraft to have some hope of reacting quickly enough to counter that threat. This takes neither large numbers of aircraft carriers nor large quantities of weapons. But it does require a sea-based aviation capability to lift sensors aloft and be able to respond quickly at long distances. Therefore, we must rely on aircraft from aircraft carriers to accomplish this sea control task for many years to come.

Assuming then that our carrier fleet has a primary mission of sea control, what kind of carriers do we want? The answer is "lots". They will have to be in lots of places. They will have to be able to suffer attrition because that is the basic nature of sea control warfare. But I will come back to the question of what kind of carriers in a moment.

The Navy cannot be built solely to satisfy the requirements of sea control even if it is the highest priority mission. Although power projection may be of lesser ultimate consequence than sea control, we may be called upon more frequently to carry it out. Carriers have been used nearly exclusively in power projection for the past 35 years. Will that continue to be the case?

If we set aside strategic deterrence and the NATO conflict which I just discussed, the next most important contribution of the United States Navy to national security will be in the Indian Ocean. Today and for the foreseeable future this country will have vital national interests which must be protected in that area. The absence of proximate American or Allied land bases excludes most static military options such as in-place armies or air forces. The Navy presents the single means of positioning American forces near enough to this nexus of American interest to be able to respond to crises quickly and to the exact degree dictated by the circumstances.

It is axiomatic that where we have a vital national interest we must also be able to deploy adequate military power. But today we cannot bring adequate military power to bear in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. Recently, Admiral Hayward summed up this situation accurately when he said, "We have a three-ocean commitment and a one-and-a-half ocean navy." And you and I are the ones who are clearly culpable. Over the past 20 years, we in the Navy have failed to lay out and forcefully express a sound strategic concept for the Navy while others, outside the Navy, with a faulted but more persuasively argued concept for the Navy, prevailed. As a result, monies to build the kind of Navy we need have not been forthcoming.

We need three capabilities to be ready to defend our interests in the Indian Ocean. First, we must be confident of sufficient sea control capability to get there and be able to stay there. Second, we need the ability to put forces ashore--to control some of the territory if necessary. Third, we need the ability to use air power to defend forces that have been inserted and to conduct air strikes. Only the Navy and the Marine Corps can do these jobs. While the Army and the Air Force can help, our sister services will always be peripheral forces in this oceanic theatre because of the territorial inhibitions I have already mentioned.

It is a long way around the periphery of the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca, to India, down the East Coast of Africa, to the Cape of Good Hope. To cover this area we will need lots of carriers and lots of amphibious ships. Without numbers, the odds of being close enough to a crisis are too low. Ships are slow in terms of political decisionmaking. If one makes a political decision today, even if the whole naval task force can sustain a speed of 20 knots, it takes more than 22 days to steam from Norfolk to the Persian Gulf. It is even farther for a Sixth Fleet carrier from the Eastern Mediterranean. The primary characteristic for carriers, then, is lots.

How do we get a lot of carriers? We get them, lots of them to do sea control in the Atlantic and power projection in the Pacific and Indian Ocean--perhaps 24 carriers or more--by building them smaller with fewer and less sophisticated aircraft. Will smaller carriers and less sophisticated aircraft do the job? Yes. First, because sea control in the Atlantic and power projection in remote areas do not call for the great

Atlantic and power projection in remote areas do not call for the great numbers of aircraft or weapons per deck with which we now operate. In neither case will we face the Vietnam practice of dumping large amounts of ordnance over long periods of time.

Secondly, we can go to lesser sophistication because power projection in the future will not require as high performance aircraft as in the past. We are surely approaching the day of real-time, remote-controlled, unmanned, electronic and photo sensors. Such sensors will allow us to remotely guide unmanned weapons to fixed or moving targets at any distance. Therefore, high performance aircraft for penetrating and evading air defenses will be less necessary. We will simply stand off. Even for the air defense interceptor role, the day of the dog-fight died with the AWG-9. Weapons will do the maneuvering in the future. Therefore, initially at least, we will need lots of Essex-size carriers with catapults, generating toward 25,000 ton carriers with VSTOL.

There is a nice coincidence here. The proliferation of small carriers will help us to be where we need to be in the Indian Ocean in times short of general war, and the same carriers would be capable of shifting to the Atlantic in great numbers in time of general war.

More emphasis on sea control not only means that we need different kinds of carriers and aircraft, but it also means that we need to change our operating habits. We need increased flexibility in flight operations. We need to get away from cyclical operations and on to flex deck operations. Who knows when more strike or interceptor aircraft might be needed? We need to get away from 12 hours on and 12 hours off flying and become self-sufficient throughout a 24-hour day because the threat will exist for 24 hours. If any skipper wants to count on his sister carriers to defend him for his 12 hours off, I think he will change his mind when the chips are down. We need to get away from thinking about Alpha strikes and think in terms of maintaining and being able to augment a certain number of VF and VS stations around every carrier and having a quick reaction VA potential.

I hardly expect unanimous agreement with this philosophy. I may well be wrong. Perhaps we do need large carriers and high-performance aircraft. There are certainly good reasons for them. Hulls are cheap, so why not build them big? Big decks are safer and more flexible. Plenty of fuel and supplies are needed when we must go deep into remote areas. Cutting down the logistics train is always desirable. The sea-keeping qualities of large carriers are needed in the North Atlantic in winter. Large carriers are better for defending themselves than small. But notice please. These are all tactical arguments. Well the naval aviator may be concerned with them because of whose life will be at stake with the lesser performance aircraft and smaller carriers that I think we should have. But the first question, the key question, must be what the strategic concept is behind what is becoming a small force of large carriers with high performance aircraft. What will the United States Navy need to

accomplish in the 1980s and 1990s that will require Eisenhowers and Nimitzes and that cannot be accomplished by small carriers? Only after we establish our strategic goals by defining the kinds and amounts of air power that we believe the nation will need from the sea, can we address tactical issues like sea-keeping and self-defense.

Let me emphasize, cheap is not cost effective if it will not do the job. Of all the arguments for large carriers, the best, in my opinion, is that it may take a large ship to handle all of the defensive weaponry that will be needed. But even with that argument in mind, I come down on the other side, on the side of numbers rather than size. Numbers give room for attrition. Numbers help confuse enemy targeting. Larger numbers mean smaller sizes which mean smaller radar and heat signatures to confuse enemy targeting. Highly miniaturized, lethal, defensive weapons are in the offing and will make a small carrier a viable defensive bet.

What then is the minimum size carrier which is defensible under my strategic concept? What is the minimum size under your strategic concept? To make that judgment we must have a strategic concept to start with. A strategic concept is the foundation of logic which gives coherence to an otherwise complex and confusing plan of ship and plane sizes and types. It is a vital first step, not only for knowing exactly what we are going to be called upon to do in the years ahead, but for being able to sell those convictions to the Congress and to the American public so that an appropriate Navy can be adequately funded.

In the past decade, the Navy has dwindled from just less than a thousand ships to about 450. From about 2700 combat aircraft to about 1700. But what is more important is that the rate of ship and aircraft procurement over the past decade will not sustain a Navy even as small as today's. All the talk of increasing the size of the Navy in the years ahead, and the projected funding level that has been sent to the Congress is a loser. It is possible there may be a temporary upsurge in numbers for a few years, but over the longer run, the mathematics of inadequate procurement spells shrinkage. If we take the number of ships that we have actually procured over the last ten years and which are programmed for the next five, it averages about 15 ships a year. Average ship life, minesweeper to carrier, is about 22 years. Twenty-two times fifteen is 330. We are today, for the last decade, for the next five, planning to sustain a Navy of 330 ships. If 22 is too conservative, make it 25. You now have a 375 ship Navy. Stretch it to 30 years. You now have a 450 ship Navy, the same as we have today. We are not growing in ships, and the story in aircraft is much the same.

What this tells us in unequivocal terms is that the Congress of the United States and the American public do not believe that the United States requires a Navy of even 12 large carriers filled with sophisticated aircraft. They are not giving us the wherewithal to maintain such a Navy. I can only conclude that the strategic concept that we have used to support our requests for large carriers and their aircraft has not been persuasive. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of each of us who cares about our Navy and its role in the security of this country to address this issue of strategy.

If we do nothing, the Navy will continue to shrink and naval strategy will have to shrink with it. Perhaps you will tend toward my strategy--strategic deterrence first, defense of the Atlantic sea lanes second, and power projection in the Indian Ocean third--the first with SSBNs and cruise missiles, the latter two with larger numbers of less expensive carriers. But, it will be to no avail to buy those small ships and lower performance aircraft if they cannot do the job. So, perhaps instead you will want to refurbish the strategy for larger carriers and persuade the Congress that it should fund 12, 15, 18 of them with full complements of high-performance aircraft. I submit, however, that after more than two decades of effort in that direction, we should recognize that it is an uphill battle. Whichever route you choose, defining the job to be done is the primary challenge we face. In my view, that is the heart of turning the corner on the decline of the U.S. Navy that we have witnessed in the past decade. The numbers clearly show that time is running out on the US Navy and with it, the security of our country.

Joint President's Report

- You might want to mention the success of this joint effort (in addition to your note to him conveying his copy--DDCI signed as Acting)
- If you choose, you may want to discuss subsequent actions.
 - Per Bruce, NFAC's preference would be to do annually in the spring (we understand that DoD's position is, if there is to be another, ~~to~~ to do it annually, also in the spring--in the fall conflicts with their budget process).
 - We will continue to do the Red side semi-annually (were the next Joint Report to be in the fall, their work must commence now).
 - FYI: 30 September (end-FY) is the cut-off for all Blue data and it remains constant.

Jim For semi-annual

7/14

I've talked with Bruce -- The above is not entirely correct.

- 1) He will continue to do Red side semi-annually
- 2) Would welcome DoD contributing semi-annually to make it a Joint Report
- 3) Believes there is some feeling in DoD not to do again
- 4) If can get DoD to do, but only get agreement from them to do annually, would opt for spring (which would seem their preference)

5) if they agree to do semi-annually, must get started ASAP to meet fall schedule